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Abstract
In this article we present Miuz, a robustness index
for complex networks. Miuz measures the impact of
disconnecting a node from the network while compar-
ing the sizes of the remaining connected components.
Strictly speaking, Miuz for a node is defined as the
inverse of the size of the largest connected component
divided by the sum of the sizes of the remaining ones.
We tested our index in attack strategies where the
nodes are disconnected in decreasing order of a spec-
ified metric. We considered Miuz and other well-
known centrality measures such as betweenness, de-
gree, and harmonic centrality. All of these metrics
were compared regarding the behavior of the robust-
ness (R-index) during the attacks. In an attempt to
simulate the internet backbone, the attacks were per-
formed in complex networks with power-law degree
distributions (scale-free networks).
Preliminary results show that attacks based on dis-
connecting a few number of nodes Miuz are more
dangerous (decreasing the robustness) than the same
attacks based on other centrality measures. We be-
lieve that Miuz, as well as other measures based on
the size of the largest connected component, provides
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a good addition to other robustness metrics for com-
plex networks.
1 Introduction
Networks are present in human life in multiple forms
from social networks to communication networks
(such as the Internet), and they have been widely
studied as complex networks of nodes and rela-
tionships, describing their structure, relations, etc.
Nowadays, the studies go deep into network knowl-
edge, and using standard network metrics such as
degree distribution and diameter one can determine
how robust and/or resilient a network is.
Even though both terms (robustness and re-
silience) have been used with the same meaning, we
will consider robustness as the network inner capac-
ity to resist failures, and resilience as the ability of
a network to resist and recover after such failures.
However, both terms have in common the methodol-
ogy for testing robustness and/or resilience. Usually,
they consist on planned attacks against nodes fail-
ures or disconnections, from a random set of failures
to more elaborated strategies using well known net-
work metrics.
We consider that an “adversary” should plan a
greedy strategy aiming to maximize damage with the
minimum number of strikes. Under this new philos-
ophy of “adversary”, we first present a new network
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impact metric called Miuz, which is the inverse of the
size of the largest connected component, divided by
the sum of the sizes of the remaining ones. Then, we
plan a greedy strategy based on recalculating the net-
work Miuz-ness after each node disconnection. We
discuss the performance of attacks based on Miuz and
other centrality measures[1] (in particular, between-
ness, degree, harmonic), compared by the robustness
index (R-index). Our main conclusion is that the
first strikes of a Miuz strategy causes more “damage”
than the classical betweenness, degree, and harmonic
metrics.
The article is organized as follows, next section
presents related work, followed by the definition of
Miuz, its attacking strategy, and its simulation re-
sults in section 3. Discussions about the main results
and conclusions are presented in sections 4 and 5 re-
spectively.
2 Related Work
Over the last decade, there has been a huge interest
in the analysis of complex networks and their con-
nectivity properties [2]. During the last years, net-
works and in particular social networks have gained
significant popularity. An in-depth understanding of
the graph structure is key to convert data into in-
formation. To do so, complex networks tools have
emerged [3] to classify networks [4], detect commu-
nities [5], determine important features and measure
them [1].
The idea of planning a “network attack” using
centrality measures has been catching the attention
of researchers and practitioners nowadays. For in-
stance, Sterbenz et al. [6] used betweenness-centrality
(bcen) for planning a network attack, calculating the
bcen value for all nodes, ordering nodes from higher
to lower bcen, and then attacking (discarding) those
nodes in that order. They have shown that discon-
necting only two of the top bcen-ranked nodes , their
packet-delivery ratio is reduced to 60%, which corre-
sponds to 20% more damage than other attacks such
as random links or nodes disconnections, tracked by
link-centrality and by node degrees.
A similar approach and results were presented by
C¸etinkaya et al. [7]. They show that after discon-
necting only 10 nodes the packet-delivery ratio is
reduced to 0%. Another approach, presented as
an improved network attack [8, 9], is to recalcu-
late the betweenness-centrality after the removal of
each node [10, 11]. They show a similar impact
of non-recalculating strategies but discarding some-
times only half of the equivalent nodes.
Concerning centrality measures, betweenness cen-
trality deserves special attention. Betweenness has
been studied as a resilience metric for the routing
layer [12] and also as a robustness metric for com-
plex networks [13] and for internet autonomous sys-
tems networks [14] among others.
3 Miuz Attacking Strategy
Given a network N of size N , we denote by C(N \n)
the set of connected components in N after discon-
necting node n. The Miuz index for a node n in N
is defined as follows:
MiuzN (n) =

∑
c∈C(N\n) ‖c‖
maxc∈C(N\n)‖c‖
− 1, if ‖C(N \ n)‖ 6= ‖C(N )‖+ 1
0 otherwise
(1)
where ‖c‖, with c ∈ C(N \ n), is the size of the con-
nected component c of the network N after discon-
necting node n (if connected, i.e. if there is an edge
between node n and another node of the network).
Notice that MiuzN (n) reflects the partition of a net-
work in several sub-networks after the disconnection
of node n and how these sub-networks remain inter-
connected. Strictly speaking, it compares in size the
core network (the largest connected component) with
the other remaining sub-networks. MiuzN takes val-
ues between 0 (the whole network remains connected)
to N − 1 (the whole network is disconnected). Fig-
ure 1 shows examples of three networks after discon-
necting the node with either highest Miuz, degree,
betweenness or harmonic centrality.
3.1 Network Attack Plan
If we plan a network attack by disconnecting nodes
with a given strategy, it is widely accepted the use
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of centrality measures (such as degree, betweenness,
harmonic) because they reflect the importance of
nodes in the network [13]. These attack strategies are
compared by means of the Unique Robustness Mea-
sure (R-index) [15], defined as:
R =
1
N
N∑
Q=1
s(Q), (2)
where N is the number of nodes in the network and
s(Q) is the fraction of nodes in the largest connected
component after removing Q nodes using a given
strategy. Therefore, the higher the R-index, the
better in terms of robustness. Our strategy is:
In each step, (re)compute the Miuz index for all
the nodes and disconnect the node with the highest
Miuz value.
Degree centrality is a simple, easy-to-compute lo-
cal (myopic) metric. Despite its simplicity, it is the
preferred metric for certain literature [13] under this
kind of attacks. Basically, it ranks nodes in terms
of their degree (number of edges or connections to
other nodes). Betweenness centrality ranks nodes by
the number of shortest paths passing throw them.
Unlike degree, betweenness centrality is not a local
(myopic) metric. It determines the importance of
a node by looking at the paths between all of the
pairs of remaining nodes. The harmonic centrality
is a metric related to the distances to the remaining
nodes. It is the sum of the reciprocal of distances to
other nodes (with the convention of 1/∞ = 0, used
when two nodes are not connected by any path). This
metric was widely studied in [16], mainly because of
its good mathematical properties.
For a better understanding of network attacks and
strategies, see [10, 11, 8, 9].
3.2 Simulations
In an attempt to study the behavior of the internet
backbone, we test our strategy in simulated scale-
free networks (it means, with power-law degree dis-
tributions, that is dist(deg) ∝ x−α) with exponents
α ∈ {2.10, 2.15, 2.20, 2.25, 2.30}. For each α, we sim-
ulate 50 networks of size 1000 (i.e., with 1000 nodes).
Then, we tested and compared strategies ranked with
a multitude of centrality measures [1] in terms of the
R-index. However, apart from Miuz, for this arti-
cle we selected and reported the results for degree,
betweenness and harmonic centrality.
Instead of just compare the robustness, after the
removal of all of the nodes, we studied the behavior
of the attacks after the only a few strikes. To do so,
we define a variant of the R-index which takes into
account only the first n strikes of an attack. Thus, for
a simultaneous attack (where the nodes are ranked by
a metric only once at the beginning), the Ra-index is
defined as:
Ra =
1
a
a∑
Q=1
s(Q). (3)
For a sequential attack, the order of node disconnec-
tion is recomputed after each disconnection. Similar
to the R-index, notice that the lower the Ra-index,
the more effective the attack is, since that gives us a
higher reduction of robustness.
Results are shown in Table 1. We tested sequential
attacks: At each strike, the next node to disconnect
was the one with the highest metric (whether it be
Miuz, Degree, Betweenness or Harmonic centrality)
in the current network. The table shows the behavior
of the Ra-index as well as the R-index in 50 scale-free
networks (generated as before) with exponent 2.1, 2.2
and 2.3. For each group of networks, we compute
the Ra-index for a ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30}, it means, the
variant of R-index after the first 5, 10, 20 and 30 node
disconnections. Miuz proves to be very effective in
attacks with only a few disconnections. Moreover,
Miuz shows that the effectiveness persists over the
number of strikes in scale-free networks with lower
exponent.
It is interesting to note that, no matter the metric
used, the damage decreases in the long term with the
number of strikes. Indeed, if we consider a complete
attack, disconnecting all the nodes of the network,
the R-index shows that an attack based on Harmonic
centrality performs better. A comparison of the R-
index is shown in Table 2. It is important to notice
that R-index is a metric for a general view of robust-
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ness, and it gives no information of how fast the net-
work is disconnected (further details in Section 4.1).
4 Discussion
We start analyzing what would be the worst “attack”.
In the worst case, a “malicious adversary” will try
to perform the maximum damage with the minimum
number of strikes, that is, with the minimum number
of node disconnections (made by the attacker). In
terms of decreasing the size of the largest connected
component, Miuz is the best attack strategy during
the first strikes. It achieves the disconnection of more
than half of the network only after nine strikes for
α = 2.10 and after five strikes for α = 2.30 (see Fig.
2).
It is important to notice that there is a break-
ing point where Miuz is no longer the best attack-
ing strategy (Fig. 3). This breaking point occurs
with less strikes as the exponent of the scale-free net-
work increases. Nevertheless, as shown in Fig. 3, this
breaking point appears after the largest connected
component is less than 1/3 of the original network.
4.1 Is the R-index a good metric for
robustness?
From the above discussion it is valid to question
whether the R-index is a good measure of robust-
ness. Maybe it is important to revisit the definition
of network robustness:
“A measure of the decrease of network functionality
under a sinister attack”[10]
Therefore, the R-index can be considered as a good
robustness metric even though it does not reflect how
fast the network is disconnected (as it is shown in Fig.
??).
We suggest that weighted versions of the R-index
could be a good compromise. This is the case of the
Ra-index proposed in Section 3 which takes into ac-
count the removal of only a percentage of the best
ranked nodes (or until the network reaches its perco-
lation threshold [10]) could be a more useful metric
for robustness and/or resilience in worst-case scenar-
ios.
4.2 Revisiting Miuz
Concerning the attacking strategies, it is important
to notice that Miuz strategy was designed for discon-
necting the network from the first strikes, aiming to
get connected components with similar sizes. This
is the main reason of its better performance than
centrality metrics in a worst-attack scenario. For in-
stance, in Fig. 1 we present examples where the Miuz
strategy performs better attacks than the ones with
other centrality metrics. In subfigure a) Degree-based
attack will select node 2 (up) while Miuz selects node
20 (down). In b) Betweenness-based attack will select
node 21 while Miuz selects node 18. In c) Harmonic-
based attack will select node 25 (left) while Miuz se-
lects node 14 (right).
Another interesting property of Miuz occurs when
maxn(Miuzn(N )) = 0. In other words, when Miuz
is 0 for any node. In that case, the full network will
remain connected no matter which node is discon-
nected. Therefore, we suggest a resilience metric as
the number (or percentage) of disconnected nodes un-
til max(Miuzn(N )) > 0, a pre-defined threshold, or
the percolation threshold [10].
5 Conclusions and Future
Work
In this article we have presented Miuz, a robustness
index for complex networks defined as the inverse of
the size of the remaining largest connected compo-
nent divided by the sum of the sizes of the remaining
connected components.
We tested our index as a measure to quantify the
impact of node removal in terms of the network ro-
bustness metric R-index. We compared Miuz with
other attacks based on well-known centrality mea-
sures (betweenness centrality, degree and harmonic)
for node removal selection. The attack strategy used
was sequential targeted attack, where every index is
recalculated after each removal, and the highest one
is selected for the next extraction.
Preliminary results show that Miuz performs bet-
ter compared to attacks with classical centrality mea-
sures in terms of decreasing the network robustness
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Table 1: Robustness against sequential attacks based on different metrics. Table shows mean R-index and
mean Ra-index for scale-free networks with exponent 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. Ra-index corresponds to the equivalent
to R-index, but only disconnecting a nodes. Attacks based on harmonic centrality are more harmful in the
long term. However attacks based on Miuz turns out to be more dangerous than the others with only a few
strikes.
metric Miuz Degree Betweenness Harmonic
scale-free network with exponent 2.1
R5-index 0.6976 0.6987 0.6994 0.6999
R10-index 0.6068 0.6092 0.6108 0.6118
R20-index 0.4929 0.499 0.5032 0.5059
R30-index 0.4051 0.4135 0.4092 0.4166
R-index 0.016 0.0155 0.015 0.0146
scale-free network with exponent 2.2
R5-index 0.6867 0.6886 0.6897 0.6903
R10-index 0.599 0.6039 0.6078 0.6092
R20-index 0.4721 0.4859 0.4841 0.4911
R30-index 0.3602 0.3812 0.3504 0.3619
R-index 0.0142 0.0137 0.0129 0.0125
scale-free network with exponent 2.3
R5-index 0.6601 0.677 0.6708 0.6734
R10-index 0.5321 0.5585 0.5449 0.5541
R20-index 0.3551 0.3926 0.3405 0.3567
R30-index 0.2586 0.2862 0.2363 0.2487
R-index 0.0123 0.1063 0.0094 0.0091
in the worst-attack scenario. Compared to other cen-
trality measures, strategies based on Miuz are more
dangerous (decreasing the robustness) in the first
strikes of the attacks. We suggest that Miuz, as well
as other measures based on the size of the largest con-
nected component, provides a good addition to other
robustness metrics for complex networks.
As future work, we can study improving through
new connections an already existing network to make
it more robust to attacks, and we can study networks
in which the topological space is correlated with the
cost of nodes disconnections, nodes which are nearby
have a lower cost to be disconnected compared with
nodes which are far apart.
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(a) Original network A, color coded
by degree centrality
(b) Original network B, color coded
by betweenness centrality
(c) Original network C, color coded
by harmonic centrality
(d) Network A, after removal of
node with highest degree centrality
(e) Network B, after removal of
node with highest betweenness cen-
trality
(f) Network C, after removal of
node with highest harmonic cen-
trality
(g) Network A, after removal of
node with highest Miuz
(h) Network B, after removal of
node with highest Miuz
(i) Network C, after removal of
node with highest Miuz
Figure 1: Effects of attacking strategies. The size shows the Miuz-ness and the color darkness reflects the
centrality metric. Metrics were recalculated after node removal.
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(a) α = 2.10
(b) α = 2.20
(c) α = 2.30
Figure 2: Effects of sequentially disconnecting nodes on power-law networks, plotting the fractional size of
largest component after disconnecting x nodes and using as a selection strategy: Miuz (blue), Degree (red),
Betweenness (orange), and Harmonic (green).
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(a) α = 2.1
(b) α = 2.2
(c) α = 2.3
Figure 3: Size of the largest fractional connected component and number disconnected nodes. Dashed line
shows the breaking point when Miuz is no longer the best attacking strategy for α = 2.1− 2.3.
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